90bca39396d2d1b02f2f18b45de631f6d056cc15
3 Commits
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 bcherb2
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90bca39396 |
fix: install bws, isolate the private config, keep credentials out of logs
Three defects the private tier could not survive a fresh machine with. bws was never installed. The private/bws-secrets row promised seven API keys and shipped no way to fetch them: dotsecrets shells out to `bws secret get`, and nothing put that binary on the box. Added as a tarball channel with checksum verification, musl rather than gnu so it does not pin a glibc newer than an older LTS carries, plus core/unzip as a real @needs dependency since the release is a .zip and 24.04 minimal has no unzip. The releases API needs filtering by tag prefix: sdk-sm is a monorepo and `latest` usually points at a python SDK, not bws. Both tiers rendered their config to ~/.config/chezmoi/chezmoi.toml, so re-running the public installer overwrote the private config and took its seven promptStringOnce answers with it. Silently -- the templates degrade politely when data is missing, so the symptom was `git commit` not knowing who you are, days later. The private tier now renders to private.toml and the cmp alias carries the matching -c. `run` echoes its argv to stderr, and the private init argv ends in https://user:TOKEN@host -- into scrollback, any `dotup 2>log`, and any agent transcript. Traced through redact_url instead, in both the live and dry-run branches. The clone is also chmod -R go-rwx afterwards: it lands at the caller umask, and .git/config stores that same credential URL. Tests: 90 passing, 9 new covering all three. |
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bcherb2
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e1332c67d8 |
feat: carry CLAUDE.md and AGENTS.md in the public tier
Phase 3 excluded all of dot_claude/, but the plan always intended CLAUDE.md to be the one agent file that ships publicly. Adds it plus the codex and pi AGENTS.md, so a throwaway VM gets sane agent behaviour with no credential. Specialized agents, skills, hooks and the language rule sets are deliberately absent -- they live in a separate repository now. The Active Rule Sets section is rewritten to say so rather than dangle a reference to a rules/ tree this repo does not carry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bcherb2
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b487b0e855 |
feat: public dotfiles tier — no credential, no identity, one installer
Fresh history. This is the repo a throwaway VM clones anonymously: it brings a
machine to a working baseline and carries nothing that makes it mine.
56 files. 50 land in $HOME, 3 are chezmoi metadata, 2 are repo documentation,
1 is the manifest, and a 15-file test harness stays behind in .tests/.
What did not travel, and why:
encrypted_private_bws-token.age a real credential; age is dropped entirely
.chezmoidata/bws.toml env-var -> secret-id map; belongs with the
tier that can use it
SECRETS.md documentation of the rules, not config
finish-setup.sh.tmpl superseded by dotup
nvim/init.lua.backup dead file
dot_claude/**, dot_codex/**, 120 files of agent config, private tier
dot_pi/**
De-identified rather than dropped:
.gitconfig [user], the GitHub ssh rewrite and both Gitea host rewrites are
identity, not configuration. They move behind an [include] of
~/.config/git/config.local, which the private tier writes. Git
treats a missing include as a no-op, so a public-only machine
reads the file and stops.
.zshrc the two gitea aliases carried a personal domain and a LAN IP.
They move behind a guarded source of ~/.config/zsh/local.zsh,
the sibling of the secrets.zsh seam phase 2 established.
nvim a commented-out LM Studio endpoint naming a LAN address.
ghostty a stale auto-generated header naming an absolute home directory.
Newly captured, never tracked before: ~/.zshenv, ~/.config/gh/config.yml. The
former sourced ~/.cargo/env unguarded, so every zsh on a machine without rustup
printed an error -- the same shape as the unguarded oh-my-zsh source phase 2
fixed. It is guarded now.
.chezmoiexternal.toml grows from one entry to six. oh-my-zsh, powerlevel10k,
zsh-autosuggestions, zsh-ai and tpm were hand-installed and declared nowhere,
which is why `chezmoi init --apply` on a clean box produced a .zshrc that broke
the shell it configures. The theme and both plugins nest under
.oh-my-zsh/custom/, which is what $ZSH_CUSTOM resolves to.
dotup gains an install engine. It resolves each selected package to a channel
(apt, brew, npm, uv, snap, deb, flatpak, tarball, script, builtin) through one
function every consumer reads, probes apt-cache before batching so a name apt
does not know moves to brew instead of failing all thirty, and retries
individually if a batch still fails -- which earned its keep on the first real
container run, where mermaid-cli's puppeteer dependency failed and the other
twelve npm packages installed anyway. --unattended computes safe defaults fresh
from the manifest rather than inheriting a state file, and refuses private and
invasive rows outright even when a stale state file ticks them.
The manifest gains @spec, a second directive kind alongside @needs, carrying the
argument a channel needs but a package name cannot supply -- the scoped npm
name, the flatpak app id, the .deb source. The TSV stays five columns wide.
Three bugs the container runs found, all fixed here:
* `apt install nodejs` gives you node WITHOUT npm on Ubuntu, so all thirteen
npm packages failed on a fresh box. The manifest asks apt for both names.
* A tool installed a moment ago is not on this process's PATH -- uv lands in
~/.local/bin, npm -g honours the ~/.npmrc prefix, linuxbrew is outside a
non-login PATH. Resolved by looking in the places we just wrote to, never by
exporting a modified PATH.
* `A || { B && C; }` is one || list, so when `command -v sudo` failed the list
failed and `set -e` killed dotup at load. On a non-root machine with no
sudo it died before printing anything. There is a regression test.
.zshenv and .p10k.zsh are marked private_. Both are shell code the login shell
executes and both applied at 664, group-writable. Third occurrence of the class
of bug phase 1 found on .pi/agent/auth.json and phase 2 found on .zshrc; the
first one found on purpose rather than by accident.
Verification: 81 assertions, 81/81 on this box and in ubuntu:24.04, ubuntu:22.04
and debian:12. The installer is driven against a directory of fake package
managers that record what they were asked to do and install nothing, so the
engine is exercised end to end without a package landing on the test machine.
`gitleaks detect` over the full history and the working tree: no leaks found,
with no allowlist and no .gitleaks.toml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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